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THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTEREST IN HIGHER LAW 
IN THE SUPREME COURT:                                               
JUSTICES MARSHALL AND THOMAS 
D. A. Jeremy Telman * 
I: INTRODUCTION: TWO AXES OF LEGAL REASONING 
For decades now, Professor Richardson has pursued the provocative position 
that there is a centuries-old tradition of an African-American interest in 
international law. This tradition is a subset of a broader category, ―outside law,‖ to 
which African-Americans appeal to highlight the injustices to which they are 
subjected under municipal law.  Professor Richardson‘s invocation of international 
law upsets suppositions of international legal realism and rationalism.  Consistent 
with international law teachings at Yale School of Law, Professor Richardson 
rejects the notion that only states can be the agents and subjects of international 
law, nor does he think that one must have some sort of title or letters (such as J.D.) 
after one‘s name in order to hold views on the nature of transnational law.  
Over the years, Professor Richardson has defined the African-American 
interest in international law in various ways, and he treats the African-American 
interest in international law in the context of a broader Black International 
Tradition.  In the early 1990s, Professor Richardson identified various international 
law doctrines that intersected with African-American interests in self-
determination,  human rights,  and limitations on the right of states to use force in 
self-defense.  
 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. The author thanks Geoffrey Heeren and 
Mary Szto for their helpful comments. 
1. See, e.g., HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) [hereinafter RICHARDSON, ORIGINS]; Henry J. Richardson III, 
The Black International Tradition and African American Business in Africa, 34 N. CAR. CENT. L. 
REV. 170 (2012) [hereinafter Richardson, Black International Tradition]; Henry J. Richardson III, 
Two Treaties, and Global Influences of the American Civil Rights Movement, through the Black 
International Tradition, 18 VA. J. SOC POL‘Y & L. 59 (2010) [hereinafter Richardson, Two 
Treaties]; Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests under 
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 42 (1993) [hereinafter Richardson, Gulf Crisis]. 
2. See Henry J. Richardson III, Mitchell Lecture, October 27, 2010, 17 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2011) (asserting that because international law has traditionally been viewed as 
something that occurs between sovereign states, actions and communications between 
subordinated national groups go ignored by scholars, officials, or observers of international law). 
3. Id. 
4. Richardson, Black International Tradition, supra note 1, at 171; Richardson, Two 
Treaties, supra note 1, at 60. 
5. Richardson, Gulf Crisis, supra note 1, at 68. 
6. Id. at 73. 
7. Id. at 70. 
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In Professor Richardson‘s book, The Gulf Crisis and African-American 
Interests under International Law, the African-American interest in international 
law is complex, but its history runs alongside the mainstream tradition of 
international law, intersecting with that tradition largely in the realms in which 
international law derives from natural law. The international law that Professor 
Richardson invokes is largely not positive law but that part of customary 
international law that serves as a repository for mechanisms and rubrics necessary 
for the preservation of what I will call, for want of a better term, human dignity.  
The narrative of Professor Richardson‘s book ends in the early nineteenth 
century. However, in subsequent articles, Professor Richardson has continued into 
the twentieth century. In invoking the Black International Tradition, Professor 
Richardson moves beyond law to international relations and beyond the African-
American experience to sketch out African-American attitudes towards and 
responses to the plight of Blacks in the Caribbean, South America, and Africa. In 
so doing, he is attentive to the links between international human rights and civil 
rights and between the U.S. civil rights movements and both foreign and 
international liberation movements, some grounded in opposition to racism and 
some grounded in the right of self-determination.  
Elsewhere, I have expressed my positivist prejudices and my skeptical 
assessment of ―higher‖ law as a font of international law protections of rights or 
attributes associated with human dignity.  I have described Professor Richardson‘s 
invocation of an African-American interest in international law as an ideal-typical 
reconstruction of what protections international law might offer—or what rights it 
might convey—upon enslaved Africans or African-Americans subject to Jim Crow 
laws and their various institutionalized legacies.  
Upon continued reflection, I see the need to add a third modality to the mix. 
The axis of legal reasoning that runs from natural law to positivism intersects with 
an axis that runs from idealism to practicality. When we consider the role of 
appeals to positive law and to higher law in the jurisprudence of the U.S‘ two 
African-American Supreme Court Justices, Thurgood Marshall and Clarence 
Thomas, the evidence is equivocal. One could argue that both decide cases based 
on deep ethical convictions grounded in personal morality. Both appeal, in very 
different ways, to sources of positive law. Where they differ, I contend, is that 
Justice Marshall‘s jurisprudence is always grounded in his rich and detailed 
understanding of the impact of law on people who reside at the intersection of race 
and poverty. Justice Thomas, in the recent opinions that I will discuss, has 
supplemented his natural law instincts with a rigid formalism that leaves no room 
for a richly contextual jurisprudence like that of Justice Marshall. In what follows, 
I will sketch out my reasons for concluding that his jurisprudence is the more 
hopeful avenue than is Justice Thomas‘s for the protection and realization of 
African-Americans‘ legal interests. 
 
8. Id. at 61–67. 
9. D.A. Jeremy Telman, Henry J. Richardson, III, The Origins of African-American 
Interests in International Law, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 395, 397–410 (2010) (book review). 
10. Id. at 399. 
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II: JUSTICE MARSHALL: HIGHER LAW AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE 
In most of his constitutional opinions, Justice Marshall relied not on 
evocations of higher law but on the text of the Constitution and on case precedent. 
This is not the place to undertake a comprehensive review of Justice Marshall‘s 
jurisprudence; a summation of representative opinions will have to suffice. 
When interpreting the Constitution‘s ―majestic generalities,‖  Justice 
Marshall was inclined to something akin to Jack Balkin‘s ―text and principle‖ 
approach.  It would be folly to deny that a ―higher law‖ sensibility informed 
Justice Marshall‘s opinions. Still, he enforced only those principles embraced in 
the constitutional text.  
In addition, he applied constitutional principles with a keen eye to empirical 
evidence of discrimination and to socioeconomic realities. On race issues, Justice 
Marshall recounted how a Porter pullman told Justice Marshall that ―he had never 
been in any city in the United States where he had to put his hand up in front of his 
face to find out he was a Negro.‖  Justice Marshall shared such stories with his 
fellow Justices so that they would not lose sight of the fact that ―there is another 
world out there‖ on the other side of the racial divide.   
Justice Marshall approved of race-conscious classifications only where 
designed to achieve remedial goals, necessary to important government purposes, 
and substantially related to those purposes.  Beginning with City of Richmond, the 
Court‘s conservative majority has subjected remedial race-conscious 
classifications to something akin to strict scrutiny,  which Justice Marshall 
 
11. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 428 (2007) (characterizing the text and principle approach as a form of 
redemptive constitutionalism); see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 291, 295–311 (2007) (elaborating on ―text and principle‖ approach to constitutional 
interpretation). 
13. Justice Marshall followed the constitutional text, where it was clear, even if doing so led 
to an outcome that was at odds with his own ethical-political perspective. See ROGER GOLDMAN 
& DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 209 (1992) (characterizing 
Marshall‘s opinions in Curtis and Loretto as evidencing Marshall‘s tendency to follow the 
constitutional text, where it is clear, ―even if the results seem inconsistent with his personal 
views‖). In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), he found that the Seventh Amendment entitled 
a white landlord facing a racial discrimination suit to a jury trial, even though a bench trial would 
have better suited the plaintiff, with whom one can assume Justice Marshall was sympathetic. In 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), he gave a broad reading 
of the Takings Clause and found that it entitled a property owner to compensation even for very 
small physical invasions of property, in this case for the installation of a cable box. 
14. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND 
THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991 4 (1997). 
15. Id. 
16. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 535–36 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517–19 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (joint opinion of Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ). 
17. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that 
_31.1_TELMAN_ARTICLE 16 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2017  3:24 PM 
292 TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L.J. [31.1 
rejected based on history and logic: the fact that Whites constitute a minority group 
in Richmond, Virginia does not make them automatically a suspect class that needs 
the Court‘s protection in order to safeguard its rights.   
Justice Marshall did not read the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection 
Clause in the light of its framers‘ narrow intent to protect African-Americans 
against racial classifications. Rather, he believed that the intent of the Equal 
Protection Clause was to abolish all caste legislation. He accordingly applied 
heightened scrutiny to cases that burden important interests (such as education or 
access to the courts) of disadvantaged persons, whether the source of that 
disadvantage sounded in race, gender, alienage, or economics, openly avowing a 
sliding scale and abandoning the increasingly opaque rhetoric about levels of 
scrutiny.  
In Dandridge v. Williams,  plaintiffs challenged Maryland‘s $250 per month 
limit on the funds a family could receive under the federal Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children Act. The $250 ceiling applied regardless of the size of the 
family.  The majority rejected plaintiffs‘ statutory and constitutional challenges, 
but Justice Marshall dissented, pointing out that the $250 ceiling was 
―fundamentally in conflict with the basic structure and purposes of the Social 
Security Act.‖  Justice Marshall also characterized the majority‘s opinion as an 
―emasculation of the Equal Protection Clause‖ in the area of social welfare 
administration.    
The dissent begins with a close reading of the Social Security Act, its 
legislative history and relevant case law, and concludes that Maryland‘s regulation 
is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.  Justice Marshall then turns his 
attention to the Equal Protection Clause and has no difficulty concluding that there 
is no rational basis for treating children differently depending on the size of their 
families.  Although grounded in a sense of social justice, Justice Marshall‘s 
jurisprudence is positivist throughout. The main thrust of his argument appeals to 
legal authority and good old-fashioned common sense, in which his opinions 
abound. 
A moral foundation underlies Justice Marshall‘s approach to the Equal 
Protection Clause. A broad view of our constitutional system‘s interest in 
promoting justice and equality inform Justice Marshall‘s dissent in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez: 
[T]he majority‘s holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic 
commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable 
acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years 
 
strict scrutiny should apply to all classifications based on race). 
18. Id. at 554 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
19. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 472–74 (1970). 
20. Id. at 474–75. 
21. Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
22. Id.  
23. Id. at 510–17. 
24. Id. at 517–18. 
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of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens. The Court does this 
despite the absence of any substantial justification for a scheme which 
arbitrarily channels educational resources in accordance with the fortuity 
of the amount of taxable wealth within each district.  
But Justice Marshall quickly segues from his moral foundation to a detailed 
analysis of the mechanisms through which Texas discriminated against poor 
children in the public education system. In comparison to property-poor school 
districts, property-rich school districts were able to allocate ten times the funds per 
pupil to public schools.  Justice Marshall agreed with the District Court‘s 
assessment that Texas distributed state funds so as to ―subsidize the rich at the 
expense of the poor.‖   
 The remainder of the opinion supports Justice Marshall‘s thesis: ―When the 
Texas financing scheme is taken as a whole . . . it produces a discriminatory impact 
on substantial numbers of the school age children of the State of Texas.‖  For 
Justice Marshall, no stranger to Equal Protection litigation, ―inequality in 
education facilities provided to students may be discriminatory state action‖ 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.  While one might think that Equal 
Protection analysis is reserved for protected classes or fundamental rights, Justice 
Marshall, good positivist that he is, shows that there is no basis, both in the 
constitutional text or in case precedent, for a demand that the protected group be 
precisely defined. He points to a recent precedent (Bullock v. Carter)  in which the 
Court applied Equal Protection analysis without being able to specify a suspect 
class.  
Justice Marshall‘s approach is similar in cases that do not arise under the 
Equal Protection Clause. In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall again begins his 
concurring opinion with what appears to be a moral claim, when he opines that the 
American people, if they were fully informed about the death penalty, would reject 
it on moral grounds.  But even here, what seems like a moral claim is grounded in 
intuitions, drawn from experience, about human nature. He is not arguing about 
our moral intuitions in the abstract—he just assumes that reasonable people, were 
they aware of how our death penalty operates, would not be willing to accept it.   
But his main argument against the death penalty was empirical—it is not an 
 
25. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70–71 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
26. Id. at 74–75. 
27. Id. at 81. 
28. Id. at 72. 
29. Id. at 84. 
30. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
31. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 92–94.  
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362–64 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); see also 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 228, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
33. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (reiterating Justice Marshall‘s view that the constitutionality 
of the death penalty should turn on the views of an informed citizenry). 
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effective deterrent and is therefore an excessive punishment.  Indeed, Justice 
Marshall rejects moral arguments that seek to justify the death penalty as a 
retributive expression of communal outrage. For Justice Marshall, such appeals to 
communal morality are insufficient to overcome the Eighth Amendment‘s 
protections of human dignity.  
Justice Marshall‘s principled approach to constitutional interpretation takes, 
as its point of departure, an abiding sense of fairness and justice. In the end, 
however, Justice Marshall‘s opinions are grounded, not in higher law, but in the 
realities of litigants who live at one of the many intersections of discrimination and 
poverty.  
III: JUSTICE THOMAS: HIGHER LAW AND PROCEDURAL FORMALISM 
Justice Thomas has established himself as one of the most unusual thinkers 
the Supreme Court has ever seen. He is the most consistently originalist Justice the 
Court has seen, with the possible exception of Justice Black.  Like Justice Black, 
Justice Thomas is not intimidated by the existence of legal precedent, no matter 
how well-established or long-standing, if he thinks that precedent is inconsistent 
with the Constitution‘s original meaning. Like Justice Black, Justice Thomas 
writes a lot of opinions in which no other Justices join.  His positions are 
principled, consistent, intellectually rigorous, and historically informed. Through 
his legal opinions, Justice Thomas, together with Justice Scalia, has inspired a 
jurisprudential movement with which other Justices, judges, and legal thinkers 
must contend. There is much to admire in Justice Thomas‘s approach to 
constitutional adjudication. However, as I contend below, it is not a jurisprudence 
that furthers the African-American interest in higher law, as articulated in 
Professor Richardson‘s work. 
Two prominent examples will serve to illustrate Justice Thomas‘s willingness 
to appeal to a higher law context for interpreting the U.S. Constitution. First, there 
is his concurring opinion in McDonald, in which he invoked the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for substantive individual 
rights not expressly granted in the Constitution‘s text.  Justice Thomas joined his 
four conservative colleagues in Heller in finding that the Constitution‘s Second 
 
34. See id. at 233–36 (reviewing the Ehrlich study, which purported to show that the death 
penalty has a deterrent effect, and finding it unpersuasive). 
35. Id. at 237–40. 
36. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N. U. L. 
REV. 529, 552–66 (2016) (comparing Justice Thomas‘s originalism with that of Justice Scalia). 
37. See id. at 535 (calling Justice Black an outlier on the Court whose originalism did not 
sway others). 
38. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); see 
also Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 63, 63 (1988) [hereinafter Thomas, 
Higher Law] (―The best defense of limited government, of the separation of powers, and of the 
judicial restraint that flows from the commitment to limited government, is the higher law 
political philosophy of the Founding Fathers.‖). 
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Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.  In McDonald, Justice 
Thomas‘s lone concurring opinion found the individual right to bear arms to be a 
―privilege‖ of citizens guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  
Thomas understands the privileges of citizens to derive from higher law, that is, 
from natural law.  McDonald was the first time that he identified a particular right 
protected as a ―privilege‖ guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  
Justice Thomas‘s defense of the ―privilege‖ of the individual right to bear 
arms is grounded both in a natural rights tradition and in a version of the realities 
of African-American lives in post-bellum America.  It is a reading of the 
significance of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause that 
has not garnered much support outside of the academy.  Even within the academy, 
Justice Thomas‘s suggestion that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
intended that the Constitution‘s first eight Amendments would be made applicable 
to the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause seems to be the minority 
view.  Justice Thomas‘s attempt to establish that the Constitution embraces sub 
silentio particular rights derived from natural law principles seems unlikely to 
succeed.  
The second example of Justice Thomas‘s appeal to higher law is his recent 
invocation of the principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence as 
informing his originalist reading of the Constitution: 
When the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that 
―all men are created equal‖ and ―endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights,‖ they referred to a vision of mankind in which all 
humans are created in the image of God and therefore of inherent worth. 
 
39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
40. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 813–49. 
41. See id. at 817 (citing to various seventeenth and eighteenth century American 
documents that describe the privileges of citizens in terms of natural law). 
42. See id. at 829–50 (reviewing nineteenth-century sources and concluding that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was originally intended to protect citizens of the several states 
against encroachments of rights protected under the first eight Amendments to the Constitution).   
43. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago, 
26 J. L. & POL. 273, 292 (2011) (arguing that Justices on both sides of the political spectrum have 
their own reasons for keeping ―Privileges or Immunities moribund‖); see also Jeffrey D. Jackson, 
Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City Of Chicago‟s Rejection of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561, 576 
(2011) (―[T]he decision in McDonald seems to clearly indicate that the Clause will indeed remain 
dormant for the foreseeable future[.]‖). 
44. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521 (4th ed. 2013) (concluding that 
while some members of the Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to extend the application of the Bill of Rights to the 
States, others did not think so and others never considered the question); see also Charles 
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 132, 
137 (1949) (―Congress would not have attempted such a thing, the country would not have stood 
for it, the legislatures would not have ratified [incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause].‖). 
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That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built.    
Even before Justice Thomas was appointed to the federal bench, he articulated his 
version of originalism in which the Constitution is understood as ―the fulfillment 
of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.‖  On rare occasions, Justices 
have appealed to the Declaration as an interpretive key to unlock the mysteries on 
constitutional protections.  Justice Thomas did not fully deploy his Declaration-
based reading of the Constitution until Obergefell.  Critics have suggested that, 
even granting that ―the foundations of rights in the Constitution are predicated on 
the innate human dignity asserted in the Declaration,‖  a right of all people to 
marry as they choose might well be protected under the Declaration‘s 
understanding of inalienable rights.  
I break no new ground here in contending that Justice Thomas appeals to 
higher law, nor do I think it should come as a surprise to anyone to hear that moral 
Weltanschauungen inform the constitutional jurisprudence of both African-
American Supreme Court Justices. The more significant methodological 
divergence between the two Justices transpires along the idealism/pragmatism axis.  
Justice Thomas‘s recent opinions have been characterized by a procedural 
formalism that fetishizes finality and rule of law principles while ignoring the 
substantive fairness issues that inform Justice Marshall‘s more practical approach. 
This formalism is a form of idealism, as it applies regardless of context. Formalist 
approaches tolerate unjust results in individual cases if necessary to promote the 
 
45. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 
Thomas, Higher Law, supra note 38, at 64 (characterizing the Constitution as ―a logical extension 
of the principles of the Declaration of Independence‖); Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain 
Reading” of the Constitution – The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 
30 How. L. J. 983, 983–84 (1987) [hereinafter Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading”] (contending 
that the Civil War Amendments must be understood in light of the principles of equality and 
liberty embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution). 
46. Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading”, supra note 45, at 985. 
47. See Alexander Tsesis, The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 369, 384 (2016) (calling Supreme Court references to the 
Declaration uncommon and irregular); see also Frank I. Michelman, The Ghost of the 
Declaration Present: The Legal Force of the Declaration of Independence Regarding Acts of 
Congress, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 585 (2016) (contending that the Declaration is not a source of law 
but is and should remain a symbol of the national commitment to social justice); Darrell A. H. 
Miller, Continuity and the Declaration of Independence, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 601, 602–04 (2016) 
(arguing that the Declaration is not law, was not intended to be law, and is not treated by courts as 
law); Lee S. Strang, Originalism‟s Subject Matter: Why the Declaration of Independence Is Not 
Part of the Constitution, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 637, 638 (2016) (arguing that the Declaration is not 
subject to constitutional interpretation).  
48. See Scott Gerber, Clarence Thomas, Fisher v. University of Texas, and the Future of 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1169, 1191–92 (2016) (noting that 
Obergefell marked the first time that Justice Thomas had invoked the Declaration of 
Independence in a case that did not involve race). 
49. Tsesis, supra note 47, at 383–84.; see also Frank Michelman, The Ghost of the 
Declaration Present: The Legal Force of the Declaration of Independence Regarding Acts of 
Congress, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 596 (2016) (hypothesizing that Justice Thomas may regard the 
Declaration as standing on equal footing with the Constitution as a source of positive law). 
50. Tsesis, supra note 47, at 384. 
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parsimonious allocation of legal resources and to strengthen the rule of law. 
In Foster v. Chatman, Petitioner raised a Batson challenge to his 1987 
conviction for capital murder.  As Justice Kagan observed during oral argument, 
the case presented ―as clear a Batson violation as a court is ever going to see.‖  
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, finding ―clearly erroneous‖ the 
state court‘s ruling that the Petitioner had failed to show purposeful discrimination 
when state prosecutors used peremptory challenges to remove all African-
Americans from the jury pool.  Justice Thomas wrote a lone dissent.    
Tellingly, Justice Thomas began his dissent with the argument that 
Petitioner‘s claim was procedurally barred.  That is, even if Petitioner‘s trial was 
tainted by racial prejudice in the selection of the jury pool, his execution should 
proceed. Justice Thomas also faulted his seven colleagues for failing to give the 
requisite ―great deference‖ to the trial court‘s finding that the prosecution had race-
neutral reasons for excluding the African-American veniremen.  That argument is 
also doubly procedural, because the ―great deference‖ standard impedes careful 
consideration of the merits of a claim and because Justice Thomas discounts, on 
procedural grounds, the probative value of Petitioner‘s new evidence (the 
prosecutor‘s files), which highlighted the prosecution‘s determination to exclude 
all African-Americans from the jury.  Justice Thomas focuses on procedural rules 
and on the thirty years that have passed since the trial, while refusing to consider 
that Georgia courts might have been unreliable gauges of the merits of Batson 
challenges in the first few years after the Supreme Court decided Batson. 
Green v. Brennan,  decided the same day as Foster v. Chatman, produced a 
similar 7-1 decision, with Justice Thomas writing another lone dissent. In Green, 
 
51. Foster v. Chatman, 136 U.S. 1737, 1743 (2016). 
52. Dahlia Lithwick, Peremptory Prejudice, SLATE (May 23, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/john_roberts_s_court_sees_racism_i
n_foster_v_chatman.html.  
53. See Foster, 136 U.S. at 1747–55 (―An ‗N‘ was also noted next to the name of each 
black prospective juror on the list of the 42 qualified prospective jurors; each of those names also 
appeared on the ‗definite NO‘s‘ list.‖). 
54. See id. at 1761 (―[T]he Court rules in Foster‘s favor . . . without adequately grappling 
with the possibility that we lack jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court‘s ruling on the merits, based, in 
part, on new evidence that Foster procured decades after his conviction, distorts the deferential 
Batson inquiry.‖). 
55. See id. at 1761–65 (―Georgia law prohibits Foster from raising the same claim anew in 
his state habeas petition . . . Without such procedural bars, state prisoners could raise old claims 
again and again until they are declared victorious, and finality would mean nothing.‖).  
56. See id. at 1765 (―Because the adjudication of his Batson claim is, at bottom, a credibility 
determination, we owe ‗great deference‘ to the state court‘s initial finding that the prosecution‘s 
race-neutral reasons for striking veniremen . . . were credible.‖).  
57. See id. at 1765–66 (―By allowing Foster to relitigate his Batson claim by bringing this 
newly discovered evidence to the fore, the Court upends Batson ‗s deferential framework. 
Foster‘s new evidence does not justify this Court‘s reassessment of who was telling the truth 
nearly three decades removed from voir dire.‖). 
58. Green v. Brennan, 136 U.S. 1769 (2016).   
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Justice Thomas, the former head of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, was the sole Justice who would have rejected Petitioner‘s 
constructive termination claim as time-barred.  The case involved a Black man 
who had worked for the Postal Service for 35 years. After he was passed over for a 
promotion, he complained that he was denied the promotion on racial grounds. 
Shortly thereafter, his supervisors accused him of delaying the mail in violation of 
federal law.  They offered him the choice between an unattractive transfer 
involving a pay cut and resignation. After some time, Petitioner resigned and then 
filed a discrimination suit based on his constructive termination.    
While the Majority found that constructive discharge claims run from the time 
the employee gives notice,  Justice Thomas would not permit Petitioner to trigger 
the alleged discriminatory matter that gives rise to his own claim.  His dissent did 
not acknowledge Justice Alito‘s concurrence, which argued that intolerable 
working conditions led to Petitioner‘s decision to resign, and thus the timing of the 
claim still turned on the employer‘s conduct.  By ignoring Justice Alito‘s middle 
ground, Justice Thomas opted for a purely procedural rule that would enable 
employers to force employees to quit on discriminatory grounds and yet escape 
any legal accountability for discriminatory conduct. In Green, as in Chatman, 
Justice Thomas‘s approach highlights procedural bars to substantive adjudication 
and shows a remarkable reluctance to explore in detail the circumstances in which 
employment discrimination claims arise. 
The same valuation of idealism over pragmatism colors Justice Thomas‘s 
McDonald concurrence. The opinion offers a highly selective review of the 
experience of African-Americans with guns. The problem that African-Americans 
faced in the post-bellum period was not, as the Colfax Massacre illustrates, that 
nobody recognized African-Americans‘ right to bear arms or that they lacked 
access to guns. The problem was that they were outgunned and courts offered no 
protection or vindication for African-Americans who were hunted down and 
slaughtered by White militiamen.    
 
59. See id. at 1790 (―Because the only employer action alleged to be discriminatory here 
took place more than 45 days before petitioner Marvin Green contacted EEOC, his claims are 
untimely. I therefore respectfully dissent.‖). 
60. See id. at 1774–75 (―We address here when the limitations period begins to run for an 
employee who was not fired, but resigns in the face of intolerable discrimination—a 
‗constructive‘ discharge.‖). 
61. See id. at 1774 (―[in constructive discharge cases] the ‗matter alleged to be 
discriminatory‘ includes the employee‘s resignation, and that the 45-day clock for a constructive 
discharge begins running only after the employee resigns.‖). 
62. Id.  
63. See id. at 1791 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (―I would hold that only an employer‘s actions 
may constitute a ‗matter alleged to be discriminatory.‘‖). 
64. See id. at 1783 (Alito, J., concurring) (proposing a rule that an employee‘s resignation 
should be considered a discriminatory act of the employer when an employer subjects an 
employee to intolerable working conditions with the discriminatory intent to force the employee 
to resign). 
65. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2009) (recounting the Colfax 
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In a racially divided society, it is not possible for the subordinate group to 
enjoy their rights and privileges on the same terms as the dominant group. Even if 
Justice Thomas rooted his opinion in the lives and experiences of those most likely 
to be subject to gun violence in the nineteenth century, it was wholly blind to the 
role guns play in the lives of urban African-Americans and the economically 
disadvantaged today. In the summer of 2016, in one week, police officers shot two 
African-American men, allegedly because they were armed, even though they 
made no attempt to reach for or use their weapons which, at least in one case, they 
were legally permitted to carry.  The ―privilege‖ of bearing arms is not worth 
much if racial injustice translates it into a privilege to be targeted as a threat. Under 
such conditions, something like Justice Marshall‘s pragmatism (and traditional 
judicial humility) should have kicked in, upholding a city‘s decision to regulate 
private gun ownership in the way best suited to that locality‘s particular needs.  
These cases highlight the contrast between Justice Thomas‘ use of higher law 
with that of Justice Marshall‘s. Justice Thomas decides these cases based on 
abstract principles and refuses to consider the real-world consequences of 
procedural bars or abstract principles. As a result, higher law can stand as a barrier 
to the vindication of the African-American interest in higher law. 
IV: THE FUTURE OF THE HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTEREST IN 
HIGHER LAW 
Professor Richardson‘s research explores the African-American tradition of 
appealing to higher law. In addition, his scholarship, like Justice Marshall‘s 
jurisprudence, is also grounded in the realities of African-American life. The 
interests that he identifies in international law are rooted in experience, and that 
grounds his work not only in abstract principles but also in the realities of the 
struggle for social justice. Still, it is hard not to read a rueful irony back into the 
sources that Professor Richardson mines to establish the history of African-
American interests in international law. Abstract principles, such as inalienable 
rights and human dignity, must have seemed to enslaved Africans and African-
Americans as akin to Sasquatch – often invoked but rarely actually experienced.  
Professor Richardson‘s work is grounded in the tradition of Thurgood 
Marshall and not in the tradition of Clarence Thomas. He does not leave us with 
abstractions. Rather, he enriches our understanding of the African-American 
 
Massacre, in which hundreds of armed white militiamen killed scores of armed African-
Americans on April 13, 1873, most of whom had surrendered or were attempting to flee the 
violence). 
66. See Richard Faussett, Baton Rouge is Passionate, and Peaceful, after Shooting of Alton 
Sterling, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/alton-sterling-
police-shooting-baton-rouge.html (recounting how police shot Mr. Sterling after a struggle and 
upon discovering that he was carrying a gun); Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Was „Reacting to 
the Presence of a Gun,‟ Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016 
/07/10/us/minnesota-officer-was-reacting-to-the-presence-of-a-gun-lawyer-says.html (recounting 
the shooting of Philando Castile whom police pulled over for a broken tail light in Falcon 
Heights, Minnesota). 
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experience and its interaction with law through rich excavation of the historical 
remains of that often elusive past. After reading his book, I encouraged Professor 
Richardson to continue his narrative forward into the twentieth century. I think that 
narrative would show that appeals to higher law take us only so far.  
The arc of moral universe bends towards justice.  It only bends towards 
justice because societies do not suddenly realize the error of their ways and mend 
themselves. Rather, each stretch along that arc contains major and minor victories, 
as well as major and minor setbacks. Appeals to higher law can bend the arc 
towards or away from justice, but the victories are more likely to occur when 
higher law informs positive law grounded in social realities.  
 
 
67. Martin Luther King, Jr., Sermon at Temple Israel of Hollywood (Feb. 26, 1965). 
